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Abstract This paper explores the reasons why economic instruments of climate change are
reluctantly applied and stresses the need for interdisciplinary research linking economic the-
ory and empirical testing to deliberative political procedures. It is divided in three parts. The
first one recalls the main issues in implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis such as information
problems, uncertainties, discounting the future and irreversibilities. The second part shows
how these issues can be treated in integrated assessment and techno-economic models and
presents a case study, which shows that
 The chosen scenario tends to stabilize atmospheric CO2 concentration at around 550 ppm
in the long run.
 Exclusion of possibility to trade CO2 emission permits under a cap regime would increase
the cost of emission abatement for OECD countries.
 Combining different flexibility instruments might lead to significant gains in the overall
cost of climate policy.
The third part presents results of a survey conducted among the main economic and
environmental associations in Switzerland. The survey reveals conflicting views on economic
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instruments. It shows how the social acceptability of these instruments can be improved in
taking explicitly into account these opposing views of special interest groups. Therefore,
policy scenarios should be selected in combining techno-economic models with empirical
studies about their political and normative context.
1 Introduction
Climate change calls for a policy response. The Kyoto Protocol explicitly refers to economic
instruments and delegates their application to the ratifying States. However as the OECD
noted, these instruments are theoretically well founded, but badly applied (Barde 1997). This
chapter examines the reasons for this limited success of economic instruments and explores
some conceptual problems and in implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis in a political decision
making process. Different policy recommendations face a social acceptance problem indeed
(cf. Spash and Carter 2002).
This contribution is divided into three parts. The first one recalls some theoretical aspects
of economic instruments based on cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The second one presents case
studies for greenhouse gas emission control using models of the NCCR project to overcome
the weaknesses related to CBA or the precautionary principle. Based on neoclassical eco-
nomic theory and the use of techno-economic models some policy responses are evaluated.
Finally, the third part, discusses the social acceptance problem in presenting the result of a
survey conducted among 240 Swiss economic and the nine main environmental associations
that form the main special interest groups in the implementation process of climate change
policies. As a way of conclusion, some fundamental issues of economic instruments for cli-
mate change policy are discussed as controversies on their implementation are at the root of
their social acceptance.
2 Issues in implementing cost-benefit and cost effectiveness analysis
The global warming problem can be addressed through five interrelated questions:
i By how much should greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions be reduced? Answers to this
question would help, for instance to assess the reduction targets actually discussed at the
international level, e.g. in the Kyoto Protocol.
ii When should GHGs emissions be reduced? This issue is related to the timing of emissions
abatement, e.g. is it better to reach a predetermined target relatively fast or is it preferred
to wait and benefit from new information and technological advances?
iii How should emissions be reduced? This question is closely associated with the choice
of policy instruments (e.g. regulations, economic instruments, voluntary agreements, and
public investments) that could be implemented to achieve the required targets.
iv Who should reduce emissions? Responses to this interrogation involve equity consider-
ations on, in particular, who has to bear the burden of the costs of climate policies and
impacts.
v At which level should the decision intervene? Though climate change is a global phe-
nomenon, actions are needed on all levels of intervention; the link between the interna-
tional, national and local levels raises a coordination problem, as different jurisdictions
intervene.
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The answers to these questions are particularly challenging, because of the peculiar
features of the global warming problem, such as large uncertainties, non-linearities and
irreversibilities, possible catastrophes with small probabilities, asymmetric distribution of
impacts, very long planning horizon, changing social perception, and the global and public
good characteristics of the problem (IPCC 1996).
CBA plays a prominent part in modelling economic decision-making procedures (cf.
Nordhaus (1993), Falk and Mendelsohn (1993), and Maddison (1995)). CBA is a decision
support technique, which was initially developed for project evaluation. The aim of CBA is
to maximise economic efficiency or, in other words, to determine (economically) optimal
policies. To achieve this, the CBA approach expresses widely different impacts in monetary
terms, usually using market prices (or adjusted market prices, when markets are distorted or
when the policy implies non-marginal changes). CBA applies a discounting procedure, to
account for the fact that benefits and costs occur in different points in time.
To evaluate climate policies in a CBA framework, it is then necessary to calculate the ratio
of the sum of expected discounted benefits (V) and costs (F) of reducing global warming,
Y0 = V0/F0. Where
V0 =
T
∑
t=0
Bt
(1 + r )t and F0 =
T
∑
t=0
Ct
(1 + r )t ,
with Bt and Ct the expected benefits and costs at time t, r the appropriate discount rate, and
T the time horizon.
The discounted costs are the monetary costs of abatement policies, while discounted
benefits are the level of damage avoidance–the difference between the cost of global warming
in the absence of intervention and the unavoidable costs of global warming associated with a
given abatement policy (which cannot be avoided because greenhouse gases are long-lived).
Following the CBA approach, a policy improves economic efficiency if discounted bene-
fits are greater than discounted costs (i.e., when Yt = Vt / Ft > 1). When there are alternative
climate policies, the optimal is the one with the greatest difference among the sum of dis-
counted benefits and cost.
2.1 Information problems
To implement the CBA approach, it is thus necessary to know and quantify all the previous
parameters, i.e. costs, benefits and the discount rate, as well as their evolution through time.
Of course, in the context of global warming, this is an incredibly complex task and it has to
overcome an extraordinary information problem. Moreover, if global warming in the very
long term will banish life on Earth, then only the costs to avoid this outcome have to be
accounted for Benefits derived from human activities will disappear too.
The evaluation of costs of climate policies is illustrated in the GMM model, which will
be presented in the second part of this chapter. The evaluation of the benefits of climate
policies, especially in monetary terms, is much more subject to debate and dispute. Indeed,
fundamental impacts of climate change are not subject to trading in markets, or are traded in
very imperfect and limited markets. For instance, climate change may have impacts on human
health and increase mortality and morbidity; may oblige people to migrate from an exposed
area; or may modify ecosystems and reduce biodiversity. The most serious consequences
of those impacts are of course outside the realm of the markets. In the past decade, a large
body of the environmental economics literature developed and applied several techniques
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to value non-market assets in monetary terms, ranging from human capital techniques and
defensive expenditures approaches to hedonic techniques and contingent valuation methods
(e.g. see Cropper 2000). Those techniques are different in their application, but they are
all fundamentally based on the same principle: simulate the existence of a market, for an
asset, which is not marketed. Those techniques are thus inferring the willingness to pay
(willingness to accept a compensation) of individuals for an improvement in environmental
quality (decrease in environmental impacts). This implies that the monetary assessments of
climate change are strongly conditioned by income and income distribution, which means
that the value of similar impacts, such as the risks to human life, turns out to be very different
in different countries (see Anaheim 2002).
However, economic valuation techniques are but one step in the complex process for the
monetary valuation of the benefits of climate change policies. As E. J. Mishan pointed out: “. . .
benefits aggregates, of course, no longer carry any independent economic recommendation.
They are value only insofar as they are made use of by the political authority as an input
into the decision making process, an input to which any weight/including a zero weight) can
be attached” (Mishan 1980, p. 157). Therefore, valuation of the benefits of climate change
policies is an interdisciplinary endeavour, involving sciences like climatology, epidemiology
and ecology, while economic techniques are then used to express the impacts in monetary
terms, and other social sciences can be implicated to assess their social pertinence. But
expressing costs and benefits of climate change policies in monetary terms is challenged by
the view that the main aspects of environment evaluation fundamentally escape quantification
and involves beliefs and finally symbolic social representations of nature, which cannot be
expressed in monetary terms (cf. Funtowicz and Rawetz 1994).
2.2 Uncertainties
Monetary valuation will inevitably be faced with fundamental uncertainties. Those uncer-
tainties will never be solved, since valuation has to be carried out not only for the present,
but also for the future. Indeed, in the future we will not only have different economies, but
different individuals and societies, with different preferences and attitudes. According to
Arrow et al. (1996), those uncertainties may be classified in three areas:
 Scientific uncertainties, which relate e.g. to the relationships between ghg emissions and
concentrations, climate feedbacks, and effects of climate change on temperature and on bio-
geo-chemical cycles. The understanding of global climate change and its inter-connexions
with microclimate change is only at its beginnings. This link may be of crucial importance
for implementing climate change on national or regional levels.
 Socio-ecologic uncertainties, concerning the relationships between human societies and
nature, e.g. agriculture production and diseases, water use and air pollution.
 Socio-economic uncertainties, which are connected to the effects of climate change on
human welfare.
2.3 Discounting the future
The final parameter that has to be quantified to apply the CBA approach is the discount rate.
The issue of the correct discount rate to be used in CBA is an endless debate in economics,
which can be traced back to Ramsey (1928). Ramsey contended that at the public level it is
not ethically defendable to actualise future generations’ welfare (i.e. the discount rate should
be nil). In the climate change context, the role of the discount rate is amplified, given the
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very long planning horizon. Indeed, using a real discount rate of 5 to 10 percent (as used in
many public projects) corresponds to artificially shortening the time horizon. In other words,
a relatively high discount rate implies that some of the impacts of climate policies will not be
considered, when they will occur relatively far into the future (e.g. 50 to 100 years from now).
For instance, 1 million damages in 100 years resulting from climate change is worth in present
value about 70 if discounted at 10%, about 7’600 discounted at 5% and 370’000 at 1%.
The choice of the discount rate will thus have a decisive impact on the optimality of a given
climate policy. In fact, given the very long time horizon, climate change strengthens the trade-
off concerning the ambivalent role of the discount rate as a mean to reach simultaneously the
efficiency in the inter-temporal allocation of resources and inter-generation equity. How can
efficiency be separated analytically from equity in order to recommend economic policies
to climate change though in the implementation process both are interrelated? The discount
rate, which also refers to the inter-temporal efficiency and equity, can only be analysed with
reference to the social objective function (cf. Burgenmeier 2003). For the latter, it means
that it is necessary to consider the ethical foundations of maximising the sum of discounted
net benefits as the social objective (of climate change policies). Indeed, maximising the
sum of discounted net benefits (which corresponds to the CBA Social objective) does not
prevent decreasing net benefits for some generations, which may be in contrast with the
concept of sustainable development where the common denominator is an ethical claim of
intergenerational equity.
For the inter-temporal efficiency aspects, the discount rate should reflect the opportunity
costs of future social net benefits (benefits minus costs) resulting from a given policy. At the
individual level, the discount rate is likely to be greater than zero, if capital is productive
and if individuals have a preference for the present vs. the future. It can be shown that the
individual discount rate of consumption (rc) is equal to (cf. Hanley 1992): rc = ρ + ε(c) c˙c ,
with ρ the individual “pure” time preference (due to impatience, the limited duration of life
and uncertainty) and ε(c) the elasticity of the utility of consumption. Thus, even if the pure
time preference is nil, the individual discount rate can be positive, if consumption is growing.
If capital markets are perfectly competitive, the interest rate is a good measure of the
individual discount rate. However, in reality capital markets are often distorted. In addition,
and more fundamentally, the individual discount rate may be different from the one that
society would use to express preferences through time. There are several reasons, which may
justify that the social discount rate is lower than the individual one. In particular, contrary to
individuals, society has a planning horizon that is infinite, since its expected life is (hopefully)
not finite. Moreover, some risks may be spread at the collective level, whereas it is not possible
at the individual level. In their seminal paper Arrow and Lind (1970) have even demonstrated
that if the risk may be perfectly spread, then the community may be considered as risk neutral,
even if it composed of risk-averse individuals. In that case, the discount rate should not be
corrected (increased) to account for uncertainty.
However, the risks associated with climate change are relatively difficult to spread, in par-
ticular those related to catastrophic events. Indeed, those risks may be very high and thus dif-
ferent from zero, even when divided among a (finite) number of individuals. In addition, these
kinds of risks possess public good characteristics and thus it cannot be divided between indi-
viduals, since uncertainty will nevertheless remain the same for each individual (non-rivalry).
2.4 Uncertainty, irreversibilities and climate catastrophes
As detailed above, uncertainty is an inherent feature of climate change. Moreover, the effects
of uncertainty on optimal abatement policies are amplified by irreversibility. In the literature,
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irreversibility possesses two forms (see Goldemberg et al. 1996). A decision may be consid-
ered as irreversible when it reduces future possibilities of choice for a long period of time
(Henry 1974).
The first is the irreversibility of climate change: once GHG emissions go into the at-
mosphere, they can only be removed naturally, but the rate of decay is extremely low, in
particular for CO2. The second is capital irreversibility: to control ghg emissions, significant
investments could be involved, and once made, they cannot be undone quickly.
The possibility of catastrophic events is also a main feature of global warming. Indeed, cli-
mate change could be a gradual and slow process, but some of its impacts may occur abruptly
or over a short period of time, as some climatological parameters cross threshold values (Na-
tional Research Council 2002). Examples of sudden global warming catastrophes are:
(i) The “runaway” greenhouse effect (climate change is much greater and occurs much
faster than the common consensus indicates);
(ii) Disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet;
(iii) Structural changes in ocean currents (which may lead to a sharp drop in European mean
temperatures).
The first studies applying CBA to determine optimal climate policies did not address these
important features, but there is now a substantial literature, which extends traditional CBA
to account for uncertainty and irreversibility in the global warming context. However, only a
few authors have attempted to include the possibility of catastrophic events (c.g. Baranzini et
al. (2003), who show that (i) gradual, continuous uncertainty in the global warming process
is likely to delay the adoption of optimal abatement policies, with respect to the standard
CBA; but (ii) the possibility of climate catastrophes accelerates the implementation of these
policies as their net discounted benefits increase significantly).
3 CBA in integrated assessment and techno-economic models
Having in mind the fundamental critique of CBA for setting climate-change policies described
before, we operate two models of the NCCR project to address these questions.
First the Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) MERGE is applied in a CBA framework or
under the precautionary principle to describe scenarios that stabilise the carbon concentration
or the maximum temperature change to low levels. MERGE is able to address issues of
uncertainties for key parameters like the climate sensitivity and the ocean diffusivity in a
stochastic framework where uncertainties will be resolved in the future (Manne and Richels
2005).
This IA model can be also extended to address problems of non-linearity and irreversibil-
ity or climate catastrophes. For example, the MERGE-E version (Bahn et al. 2006b) specifies
time constraints on temperature changes and rates of temperature changes such that the ther-
mohaline circulation (THC) of the North Atlantic will never be interrupted. Temperature con-
straints are estimated with the help of specific climate models (Knutti et al. 2002) concerning
the THC. Examples applying MERGE are given in the same special issue (Bahn et al. 2006a).
The report of Bahn et al. describes how a neoclassical economic model like MERGE can be
linked with a climate model of intermediate complexity to perform analyses in a CBA or in
a cost effectiveness framework.
The second model applied in the NCCR project is the energy systems model GMM
(a partial equilibrium bottom-up model) where following the precautionary principle we
evaluate different policies and targets that stabilize carbon emissions to 10 GtC/yr by the
year 2050. These case studies are imposed as a set of policy overlays on a Baseline sce-
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nario to define the responses to climate change. The case studies are described in some
details here and explain how the “what”, “where”, “when” and the “technological” flexibil-
ity can be realized. The model is also used to perform sensitivity analyses on the discount
rate.
The GMM model is a technology oriented “bottom-up” model that obtains the least-cost
configuration of the global energy system for a given time horizon (50 years) under a set of
climate-response policy settings (Rafaj et al. 2005). At the same time, GMM endogenises the
technological learning (ETL) for emerging technologies, as is described in detail in Viguier
et al. (2006) also in this volume. The economic feedback of climate-response policies is
captured in GMM by the partial equilibrium procedure, in which the model calculates its
objective function as a sum of (a) the energy/technology production cost and (b) the loss of
consumer welfare associated with demand reduction.
In the case of climate policies, the change in the objective function, i.e., an increase
or decrease in the total cumulative discounted system cost over the reference development
indicates the cost impacts of a specific policy instrument applied (Loulou et al. 2004).
Another economic indicator that is frequently used for the evaluation of climate policies
is the marginal abatement cost, which defines the cost of reduction of the last unit of GHG
emission in order to reach the prescribed emission level. Both indicators, i.e., the change in
the total system cost, as well as marginal abatement cost of GHG reduction are used below
for the evaluation of different setups of climate policies.
The way, in which questions of cost effectiveness or CBA with respect to climate polices
can be translated into the formalised GMM modelling framework, is exemplified using an
illustrative policy scenario GHG-Cap&Trade and its modalities that reflect different climate
policy setups and flexibility mechanisms as being imposed on the Baseline development.
Section 3.1 refers to cost effectiveness analyses with GMM while Section 3.2 to CBA.
3.1 Illustrative policy scenarios
The selection of the reference case is crucial for the modelling-based policy analysis, there-
fore a short description of the Baseline scenario and its assumption is provided here. The
Baseline scenario that underlines all policy cases is closely related to the B2 scenario reported
by the IPCC (2000). The baseline storyline assumes a given degree of increased concern for
environmental and social aspects and is consistent with current institutional frameworks and
current technology dynamics. Although not calibrated to match exactly the results of the
original B2 scenario, the Baseline scenario reported herein may represent a plausible devel-
opment of the global energy system. The allocation of resources is based on an optimisation
performed under conditions of perfect foresight with ETL considerations included. In addi-
tion, global spillovers of experience and knowledge transfer (including from North to South)
are assumed to take place. Time evolution of global energy related CO2 and other GHG emis-
sions in the reference development are summarised in Figure 1. Total global energy-related
carbon emission rates in the Baseline scenario increase continuously from the present level
of 6.3 GtC/yr throughout the time horizon modelled, giving an annual rate of 1.97%/yr and
reaching a level of 16.8 GtC/yr by the year 2050. Inclusion of non-CO2 gases in the Baseline
increases the total carbon-equivalent (C-eq) emissions to 19 GtC-eq/yr in the year 2050.
3.1.1 “How much and what?”
The total level of CO2 reduction in the GHG-Cap&Trade scenario follows in our example
a precautionary principle that imposes a stabilising cap on the global energy-related CO2
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Fig. 1 Global GHG emissions (CO2, CH4, N2O) in the Baseline scenario and the reduction target in the CO2-
and Multigas-mitigation scenarios
emissions to 10 GtC/yr by the year 2050. The global emission trajectory considered in this
exercise might in a long run lead to a stabilisation of the atmospheric CO2 concentration
at around 550 ppm. Inclusion of non-CO2 GHGs (i.e., the multigas abatement strategy)
increases the reduction target in 2050 to 11 GtC-eq/yr proportionally to the higher level of
GHG emissions in the Baseline, as is illustrated in Figure 1.
Consideration of non-CO2 GHGs involves the first type of flexibility in the climate policy-
making and refers to the “what” flexibility, i.e., the possibility to abate the most cost-efficient
mix of GHGs in a given time period. The Kyoto protocol identifies six substances that can
contribute to reaching the overall GHG mitigation goal (UNFCCC 1999). In addition to
CO2, the GMM considers emissions of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Although
the CO2 emissions associated with the fossil-fuel combustion represent the far largest con-
tribution to the total GHG-emission levels, ignoring other Kyoto-gases would lead to the
abandonment of a range of cost-efficient abatement options and potential gains because of
substitution among gases. The impact of “what” flexibility on the overall cost of GHG miti-
gation policy is depicted in Figure 2, showing the cost-reducing effect of multigas abatement
strategies.
3.1.2 “Who and where?”
The allocation of emission entitlements across world regions in the GHG-Cap&Trade sce-
nario is based on an assumption of extending the Kyoto protocol targets beyond the first
commitment period of 2008–2012 to the global level such that a smooth global CO2 emis-
sion trajectory to 10 GtC/yr will be obtained while taking into consideration the aspiration
of developing countries for economic growth. The allocation principles for the distribution
of entitlements are described in Rafaj et al. (2005). The Kyoto protocol suggests a number
of international mechanisms, with which the reduction commitments can be achieved more
efficiently at a minimum cost. These mechanisms take advantage of the “where” flexibility
of mitigation. The case study presented herein introduces the “where” flexibility through
a generic GHG-emission trading scheme without distinguishing between the specifics of
Kyoto-instruments, i.e., IET, JI, or CDM. As is shown in Figure 3, exclusion of possi-
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Fig. 2 Cost impacts of the flexibility mechanisms for the GHG-abatement strategies. Under the “when”
flexibility case a cumulative emission constraint for the period 2010–2050 is imposed instead of annual
emission targets
Fig. 3 Cost impacts of the “technological” flexibility and international trading with C-eq emission permits
bility to trade CO2 emission permits under a carbon cap regime would increase the cost
of emission abatement for regions with expensive mitigation possibilities, such as OECD
region.
3.1.3 “When?”
The timing of imposition of stringent climate policies is particularly important for the policy
acceptability. Considering the climate change as a global problem with long-term conse-
quences, the question is how to allocate the global carbon budget over time to achieve cost
optimality in achieving a given policy goal. In GMM, this question is addressed by using a
“cumulative” GHG constraint for the whole commitment period, i.e., 2010–2050. This con-
straint is equal the integral of the regionalised annual targets introduced above, and involves
the “when” flexibility in GHG mitigation. Optimal timing in GHG reductions is associated
with important cost impacts. Marginal cost reduction due to “when” flexibility is quanti-
fied in 2050 at about 35$ /tC-eq as compared to the GHG-Cap&Trade case with annualised
emission bounds. As shown in Figure 2, combining the different flexibility instruments, i.e.,
“where”, “when” and/or “what”, might lead to significant gains in the overall cost of climate
policy.
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3.1.4 “How and at which level?”
Successful achievement of prescribed GHG-reduction targets requires the implementation
of appropriate policy instruments. The Kyoto protocol and subsequent international agree-
ments are less specific in the choice of methods to be used for domestic reduction efforts.
Nevertheless, adoption of proper domestic policy instruments will be essential if the GHG-
reduction targets are to be met. Such policies could vary from application of “command &
control” regulatory options to a carbon tax or voluntary measures. Due to the level of regional
aggregation, specific domestic policy instruments are not modelled individually in this case
study, but they are assumed to be implicit to the emission cap imposed on the regional en-
ergy systems. A detailed analysis of the acceptance of a group of selected domestic policy
instruments for Switzerland is provided in Section 4.
The question of “how” the emission reduction shall be realised is closely related also to
the last type of flexibility addressed in this paper. The so called “technological” flexibility
would refer to the ability of the energy system to adopt for a “carbon-constrained” world.
Decarbonisation of the global energy system implies the substantial structural changes in the
energy sector and deployment of advanced technology options. In this context it is interesting
to evaluate the impacts of technological progress under the climate-policy regime. An example
of this phenomenon is provided in Figure 3, where the costs of the GHG-Cap&Trade policy-
scenario with ETL are compared with scenario that does not consider cost-reducing effects
of technological learning.
3.2 Information problems
As discussed in Section 2.1., economic valuation of costs and benefits that could be linked
to the adoption of climate policies is a complex task surrounded with a broad range of
uncertainties. An example of valuation of potential benefits of the illustrative policy scenario
GHG-Cap&Trade is provided here based on avoided damages due to air pollution.
It is well recognised that climate policies could indirectly lead to a significant reduction in
air polluting substances. This effect is considered as a secondary benefit of a climate policy.
Reduction in air pollution might be substantial especially in the developing regions with
relatively low air quality standards. The question that arises in the CBA context is how to
monetize the avoided damage that would occur because of the implementation of climate
policies with GMM.
An approach used in this exercise is to scale first the damages per unit of kWh of a specific
power plant based on the results of the ExternE project (EC 1999). The information problem to
be overcome is the adjustment of ExternE values of damage costs valid for typical conditions
in Western Europe (based on specific willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures) to the regions
with unknown WTP. The scaling method can be based simply on the population density of
the affected region, or the welfare of affected population using expected projections of GDP.
Then, based on the electricity generated by region and power stations in a scenario, one could
estimate the avoided damages due to the climate policy adopted. As is illustrated in Figure
4, the selection of a specific scaling approach leads to a significant difference in the value of
avoided damage. The lower range of avoided damages in the figure represents the damage
cost adjusted to the population density, and the upper range reflects the damage cost scaled
to GDP in market exchange rates. The middle value reflects the scaling to the per capita GDP
in purchase power parity (Rafaj 2005). Notice that in the same reference, the GMM model is
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Fig. 4 Comparison of cost and secondary benefits for the GHG-Cap&Trade policy scenario expressed as a
change in the cumulative discounted energy system cost relative to the Baseline scenario. (Note: dr = 5%)
used in a more formal CBA framework addressing simultaneously climate policies and the
external costs associated with electricity generation.
Implications of the modelling results presented in Figure 4 can be highly relevant for
policy-making efforts in the area of climate change, particularly for the developing countries,
since they suggest that the secondary benefits of the CO2-abatement might offset the direct
costs of mitigation.
3.3 Discounting issue in the GMM modelling framework
Given the controversy in the proper selection of the discount rate (dr) for climate policies
outlined in Section 2.3., it is advisable to evaluate the cost impacts using different dr values.
A 5% per annum discount rate has been used in the Baseline and policy scenarios reported
above. Two sensitivity cases are analysed herein for the GHG-Cap&Trade scenario, using the
values of 3% and 7%. The rate of 3% is indicated by IPCC (2001) as a rate based on “ethical”
considerations. The latter value of 7% reflects more the present energy-market situation and
the dr value is used to approximate the cost of capital invested in more risky projects (see,
e.g., AEN-NEA 2005).
Figure 5 shows the change in objective function over the Baseline for the GHG-Cap&Trade
scenario applying different discount rates of 3, 5, and 7%. For consistency, the cumulative
system cost in the policy scenarios is compared to the Baseline scenario, calculated by using
the same discount rates as in the policy cases. Variations in the total discounted cumulative
cost relative to the Baseline disclose a decreasing trend in the total cost for the sensitivity
scenarios with an increasing dr. The 3%-discounting results in a total cost that is higher than
in the scenarios with dr of 5 and 7%. On the other hand, marginal costs (undiscounted) of C-eq
permits globally traded across world regions are the highest in the case of dr = 7%, which
reflects the increase in the cost of investments in the abatement options needed for reaching
the GHG-reduction target. This trend is pronounced in the second half of the computational
period, where the carbon constraint is the most stringent.
3.4 Final thoughts on the policy recommendations based on a modelling exercise
The purpose of the modelling exercise presented in this section was to provide an example
of how to handle the critical issues raised by CBA as pointed out in Section 2. Clearly, the
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Fig. 5 Changes in the climate policy cost in relation to different discount rates
case study performed with the “bottom-up” GMM model suggests that a number of the key
questions related to the climate policy-making can be addressed and the quantitative results
provided might be used to support policy decisions.
The modelling results indicate that at the regional and global level the flexibility mech-
anisms for climate policies constitute powerful instruments to moderate the cost penalty
invoked by the policy adoption. The analysis also shows that the combination of elements
within a cost-efficient portfolio of climate policy instruments might provide significant gains
and could potentially improve the acceptability of the policy implementation. At the same
time, the successful implementation of climate policy tools is unthinkable without policy
actions in favour of technology progress.
Overcoming the information problems associated with uncertainties (in, e.g., valuation of
damages, the choice of discount rates, or irreversibility) represents a challenging task for any
formalised modelling analysis. The results reported here illustrate that the choice of these
key parameters influence the overall outcomes of a given policy-scenario. In this context it
is highly relevant to explore, how the policy responses evaluated and proposed on the basis
of neoclassical economic theory and the use of techno-economic models could be accepted
by all relevant actors needed to reach a consensus in the debate on climate change policy
specification.
4 Social acceptance of policy recommendations
When it comes to translate policy recommendations derived from modelling into the imple-
mentation process, considerable resistance can be observed. One of the main obstacles is
linked to the distributional aspects of such policy recommendations. In order to overcome
this obstacle, income redistribution proposes the recycling of tax revenues. However, using
regional and individual data, Thalmann showed that for most voters the mode of revenue re-
cycling did not matter during the Swiss vote on energy taxes in September 2000 (Thalmann
2001). Therefore, a more detailed study is needed in order to understand why there is such a
resistance to climate change policy. Wallart identified the main factors for environmental tax
opposition (Wallart 2000) and our own findings on the dilemma between theory and practice
of economic instruments for environmental protection are based on an inquiry which we have
conducted among the 300 most important Swiss corporations (Bu¨rgenmeier et al. 1997).
The firms have been asked about the importance of the major objections raised in the public
debate about the introduction of ecological taxes. Though the majority of the answers are
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overwhelmingly positive (66.7%), a first proposal to implement a CO2 tax at the beginning
of the ‘90s has been rejected in the preliminary consulting process which precedes any new
legislation in Switzerland. The majority of firms agree on an environmental tax, but reply
through their professional organisations negatively in the consultation. It may be that these
organisations have to protect the weakest member and reflect, therefore, the firms, which
replied negatively. These responses may also illustrate the paradox of collective action,
where in the decision-making process the collective outcome is in opposition to individual
beliefs (Olson 1971).
Finally, another explanation is linked to the conditions in which ecological taxes are
introduced. If these taxes are accepted as a principle only, they raise many objections as far
as concrete and very much differentiated individual situations are concerned.
4.1 Special interest groups and policy implementation
In order to further explore the issue of social acceptability of economic instruments in the
field of climate change, we have carried out another survey among 240 economic and 9
ecological associations in Switzerland during 2003. This research is part of a larger project,
which deals more generally with the socio-economic aspects of climate research within the
Swiss National Centre of Competence and Research on climate (Bu¨rgenmeier et al. 2006).
Figure 6 shows that the Swiss economic associations are more favourable to the introduc-
tion of voluntary agreements and incentive measures, such as taxes and tradable emissions
certificates, comparing with direct controls (i.e. regulation or standards). For each of the
17% 15%
65%
83% 85%
35%
0%
50%
100%
Voluntary Agreements   (N=53) Incentive measures (taxes and
permits) (N=53)
Command and control    (N=49)
unfavorable or rather unfavorable favourable or rather favourable
CI = Confidence Interval (95 %)
CI = +/- 9% CI = +/- 9%
CI = +/- 12%
Fig. 6 Introduction of climate policy instruments: Opinions of the Swiss economic associations
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Fig. 7 Ranking of preferences of forty-nine Swiss economic associations for economic instruments
three measure, we directly asked the associations if they were favorable (or not) to their
introduction in the field of climate policy.
Indeed, a significant majority (85% +/−9%) of Swiss economic associations state they are
in favour of incentive measures (i.e. taxes and permits). Figures 7 and 8 give more detailed
results about this type of instruments and clearly show that Swiss economic stakeholders
favour tradable certificates rather than taxes.
According to Figure 7, our survey shows that the favourite instruments to these economic
associations are in this order: voluntary agreements are ranked first, information and education
programmes second, international certificates third, national certificates fourth, taxes fifth,
and command and control instruments were ranked the last.
According to the N-Persons Game Theory, this ranking was established based on the
Condorcet Winner (CW) method (i.e. the alternate which beats all the others if on compares
them even per pair), which is considered the best one so the result of a game (i.e. collective
choice) reflects the structure of individual preferences.
This ranking clearly reflects the previous results regarding voluntary agreements (first
position) and direct controls (last position). It also makes a difference between two types
of incentive measures: taxes and tradable emissions permits or certificates. In fact, we can
guess that taxes obtained a high score in Figure 6 because they were combined with permits
under the “incentive measures” label. But taxes are probably perceived as a more stringent
instrument compared to tradable certificates, both national and international as with the
former measure the price is set by the government, whereas in the latter the price is set by the
market. In addition, taxes imply a different structure of property rights, compared to freely
distributed tradable certificates (cf. Baranzini et al. 2000). Indeed, with the former the polluter
has to pay for each ton emitted, while with the latter, it receives an amount of emission rights
free of charge. Of course, at the emitter’s level, this implies that the tax is costlier than freely
distributed tradable certificates. In addition, as pointed out by Vatter (2002), another reason
for the weak success of taxes is that stronger redistributive measures (like an emission tax)
create more identified winners and losers. In the political decision process, those who have
to pay have often a strong lobby to combat such an amendment bill. The cost factors as well
as every change of the status quo represent a threat to the introduction of ecological taxes
(Vatter 2002).
Swiss economic associations were then asked what was their position on votes on four
different kinds of energy taxes that were already submitted to the Swiss population (all the
proposals were refused):
1. The “Solar initiative”, which aimed to introduce a tax of Sfr. 0.05/kWh on non renewable
energy,
2. The “Energy conservation package” to introduce a Sfr. 0.03/kWh incentive tax on energy
to promote renewable forms of energy,
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Fig. 8 Federal popular ballots on energy taxes: position of the Swiss economic associations
3. The “Green tax reform”, an incentive tax on non-renewable energy of Sfr. 0.20 as a
maximum; and finally
4. The “initiative for assured social security: to tax energy instead of labour”.
The first three ballots took place on September 24, 2000 and the last one on December 2,
2001.
Figure 8 shows that half of the economic associations stated that they did not take position
on these issues. However, one can wonder about the reasons for this: it may be possible
that these associations did not want to show their opposition to the measure. The other half
overwhelmingly took position against these green taxes and only a minority of the economic
association were favourable to green taxes, which thus are less better accepted by economic
associations that Figure 6 does let it show.
It appears that economic associations are more favourable to less stringent measures that
leaves them a greater room for manoeuvre; the example of the efforts of some of them in
favour of a “climate centime” instead of a tax on CO2 shows how reluctant they are to the
implementation of a tax.
If we compare the results of both surveys – the 1997 one on 300 Swiss corporations and the
2003 one among 240 Swiss economic associations–we can raise a paradox in the behaviour
of the Swiss economic associations concerning their acceptance of incentive measures, and
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Fig. 9 Ranking of preferences of forty-nine Swiss economic associations and four Swiss environmental
associations for economic instruments. This ranking was established based on the Condorcet Winner (Cw)
method
in particular of an ecological tax, and more generally between measures accepted in theory
and rejected in practice.
In order to go deeper into the analysis, we compared the answers from the economic
associations with the ones obtained from four environmental associations. These results are
not statistically representative due to the small number of answers from green associations and
serve only to give a broad idea of their preferences, as all these four associations established
the same classification.
The results summarized in Figure 9 show a clear opposition between economic lobbies
and ecological interest groups. The former prefer voluntary agreements and market incen-
tives. The latter are for command and control. These opposing views show the potential for
paralysing the policy debate and express the mutual lack of trust of these pressure groups.
The lack of consensus makes CBA difficult to apply, as the valuation of cost and benefits are
discussed in a very controversial way when it comes to apply policy of climate change.
We suggest that a difference in the perception of economic instruments policy can be
found in conceptual problems raised by an economic approach to climate change and not so
much in technical difficulties related to CBA.
4.2 Conceptual problems of economic approaches to the environment
Neoclassical theory considers the natural environment as a free good, having no monetary
value until its over exploitation makes it scarce and converts it into an economic good. The
theory that tries to model this transformation considers the environment as an externality to
the economic sphere. This surprises most researchers in the social sciences. Robert Hettlage
expresses this astonishment as follows: “Externalities are built, whose exploration can be
delegated to other sciences as they contaminate the model (this would at once clean the
theory), if this explanation effort were necessary” (Hettlage 1993, p. 84).
The conceptual aspects arising in the economics environment relationship concern the
notion of externality, the determination of non market values and the social learning process,
which has to legitimate any policy in environment protection (cf. So¨derbaum 2000).
4.2.1 The environment: An externality?
When it treats the environment as an externality, the concept of social cost is at the hearth of
the debate. The externality argument states that market failures arise, when private benefits
from some economic activity impose an uncompensated cost to someone else. Such a case
directly pertains to pollution, but has a more general scope. Every time there is an immediate
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benefit from an economic activity whose marginal cost is less than the expected marginal
revenue because a third party bears part of the total costs, we are confronted with market
failure. No incentive to reduce or to stop such an activity exists. The total cost to society is
greater than the cost borne by the one who receives the private benefit. This situation calls
for government intervention. The recommended policy is to ask the government to invoice
the individual for the social cost created, for example through a CO2 tax. This method of
justifying government intervention consistent with market rules raises a daunting question: to
what degree can the private marginal cost be compared to the social one? Such a comparison
would only be conceptually acceptable if the costs could be measured objectively (Buchanan
1969).
If pollution reduces this value and requires a tax to be introduced, it is followed by income
transfers, which ultimately cannot be evaluated without value judgements.
4.2.2 Non-market values
The value of the natural environment as determined by a market refers to an economic use of
it. Yet the value of the environment is also determined outside the market and independently
of any economic use. Because the natural environment has an intrinsic value, the market
cannot exclusively determine its worth. Likewise, failure to subject the natural environment
to economic use–albeit possible on both a technological and a normative plane–can give the
environment a “non-use” value that economists readily associate with an opportunity cost.
This cost is part of every economic choice, and is defined by the fact that any economic de-
cision related to managing scarce productive resources necessarily implies giving something
up (cf. Fankhauser 1995).
Climate change policy essentially finds its legitimacy in the change of non-market values
determined by its social perception. This change takes place over a long time, and is codified
in laws, regulations, morals and customs, which reflect the fact that people are increasingly
aware of problems related to the protection of the environment, despite the fact that the
intensity of this awareness can vary. Social concern about an undamaged environment can
be supplanted by other, temporarily more worrying problems such as unemployment.
It is therefore illusory to think that changing social perceptions of the natural environment
will only change the institutions of a society and leave its perceptions of the economy
untouched. Accordingly, we cannot observe constant and inalterable economic behaviour,
but rather a permanent interaction between social values and human behaviour. The origin
of changing motivations in individual as well as collective behaviour thus becomes crucial
to the building of an operational climate change policy.
However, there is no scientific criterion that enables us to move from an individual to a
collective level. Society’s economic welfare cannot be defined by simply adding up individual
behaviours, and then treated as a simple problem of factor allocation. A change in the social
utility function does not take into account of the factors, which induced it (Feldman 1983).
4.2.3 Environment protection: A social learning process
In practice, cost-benefit analysis assumes away those factors and relies on engineering ex-
pertise. Even if, due to the complexity of the criteria used, impact assessments are made by
teams, which also include social scientists, most analyses use a multi-criteria approach, where
the weighting of the different explanatory factors becomes essential. Engineers apparently
prefer the weighted sum approach, which does not differentiate between explanatory factors
on a qualitative level. Thus, if one variable is considered less important, the low weighting
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assigned to it cannot do justice to cases where this variable – for example above a certain
emission level and sometimes only in relation to another variable – can, during the valuation
procedure, take on a totally different meaning.
A learning aspect not only makes it likely that the value function of the criteria will be
changed, but also increases the information of the actors concerned by the project and their
knowledge of possible interactions between different variables. Consequently, we encounter
a problem that has become familiar by now, namely the estimation of the social values and
costs submitted to normative judgements, which varies according to the changing social
perception of climate change over time. In other words, taking the related costs into account
is a normative process, dependent on a politico-legal context, which is also supposed to reflect
these changes. This conclusion thus rules out any allegedly objective valuation method.
Recent developments try to weight the different criteria by a normalize approach involving
non-scientists in the assessment effort (for a survey of the issues and methods used in this
field, see Rotmans and van Asselt 2002). Therefore, the actors’ information improve during
the negotiation. The normative dimension of policy recommendations becomes part of the
analysis. As our survey has shown, economic actors such as special interest groups stress
that any assessment must be combined with a negotiation process. They expect increased
transparency in applying valuation criteria, as well as a learning effect for all the partners
concerned by a policy recommendation, in order to improve the instruments that are to be
introduced with a view to enhancing climate change.
5 Conclusion: Towards a socially accepted policy mix
The debate about values, the internalisation of social costs and the explicit recognition of
ethical aspects make a single minded, exclusive economic approach to climate change policy
obsolete. Such an approach contributes to the problems of the social acceptance of economic
instruments. In order to overcome this obstacle the following two interrelated research strate-
gies are followed:
 The first research strategy consists of conventional models, that take the environment into
account, either through public goods theory or through property rights theory. These two
theories cover the main issues in environmental economics.
 The second strategy refers to more global models, which try to feature relationships between
economics and the biosphere. In the same way, models, which add a social dimension in
order to come closer to the concept of sustainable development (where these three levels:
economic, environmental, social are included) also belong to this group, and cover the field
of ecological economics.
Finally, the crucial point is the integration of the ethical dimension in the traditional the-
oretical representations of the economy that society has adopted (Bu¨rgenmeier 1993). The
trend is to delegate ethical questions to the human sciences and thereby to “clean” the eco-
nomic model, which then constitutes the main reference. Ethics, as well as the environment,
are then being treated as an externality to the market. This distinction makes it possible to
work on a “scientific” level and root criteria in a positive sense. Theology and moral phi-
losophy are assigned the task of maintaining the social representation of the workings of
the economy as intact as possible, treating these aspects outside the economic sphere. The
intellectual challenge lies not only in preventing such a development (which is already well
under way if one is to judge by the many institutes specialised in economical ethics), but
also in integrating ethical considerations in economic reasoning itself (Harsani 1955). The
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promotion of economic policies of climate change has to be completed by social policies
in order to catch such ethical aspects (Spash 2002). Such social policies not only include
transfers of income, but also basic values of the institutional setting of the market, such as
legal regulation of “fairness” and non-discriminatory practices. This extension inevitably
exposes economics to a dilemma.
 Economic reasoning tries to reduce pollution at the lowest possible cost. It proposes an
optimisation calculus that equalises the marginal cost with the marginal benefit of any
economic activity. If many actors on a market are responsible for a given polluting emission,
it recommends a policy reducing these where the marginal costs of doing so are smallest.
Following the efficiency criterion, economic reasoning therefore allows for a differentiated
treatment of actors on a market according to their cost or utility functions.
 On the contrary, moral reasoning, often legally codified, is concerned with equality of
treatment, which originates in a normative judgement (for example, through the collective
memory of a community). This normative judgement may also come out of a political
process. If this process is democratic, it is supposed to express the opinion of a majority.
Once economic theory recognises that there may be as many normative judgements as actors
on the markets (and as many individual actions), legal reasoning only refers to collective
preferences. Therefore, implementation of climate change policies is normative by nature.
Economic modelling has to be extended to the understanding of a political process.
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